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did not produce ajury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It was,
therefore, constitutionally deficient; it denied Sullivan his Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial.
All constitutional errors do not, however, require reversal. 6 In
concluding that a Sullivan-type error is not amenable to harmless-error
analysis, the Court distinguished a situation such as that found in
Sandstrom v. Montana.7 The Sandstrom trial court - at the request of
the state and over the objection of the defendant -instructed thejury that
"It~he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary acts." On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held
that the instruction was unconstitutional because the jury might have
interpreted the presumption as being conclusive, oras shifting the burden
of persuasion, and either interpretation would have violated the Four-
teenth Amendment's requirement that the State prove every element of
a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.9 The Sullivan court
explained that when the jury is instructed to presume an element of the
offense, it must still make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt as to the
facts upon which the presumption is based. Therefore, if the predicate
facts are closely related to the presumed fact, and no reasonable juror
could find one without finding the other, the court may be able to
conclude that the presumption did not influence the jury's findings.10
The Sullivan court further articulated a standard for determining
whether constitutional errors are indeed harmless: "The inquiry ... is not
whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would
surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.", Il Because
in the Sullivan case there was in effect no jury verdict of guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, there can be no meaningful question of whether the
same verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would have been
rendered without the constitutional error.
6 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (holding that even
errors of constitutional magnitude may be harmless, but that a reviewing
court must consider the error's actual effect on the jury verdict to
determine whether it was harmless).
7 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
8 Id. at 512.
9 Id. at 514-527.
10 Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2082.
11 Id. at2081.
12 See Strawdernian v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 855, 108 S.E.2d
376 (1959), and Smith v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1111, 156 S.E. 577
(1931). See also McCoy v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 731, 112 S.E. 704
(1922); Manetta v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 123,340 S.E.2d 828 (1986);
Cooper v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 497, 345 S.E.2d 775 (1986).
13 The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse offers the following
instruction as a guideline:
Sullivan should not present many issues for Virginia practitioners.
Virginia's Model Jury Instructions which deal with capital murder,
instructions 34.100 and 34.120, each mention "prove beyond a reason-
able doubt" three times, but do not attempt to define the term. Instruction
2.100 however, entitled "Reasonable Doubt and Presumption of Inno-
cence," makes a cursory attempt at a definition: "A reasonable doubt is
a doubt based upon your sound judgment after a full and impartial
consideration of all the evidence in the case." The Supreme Court of
Virginia has discouraged attempts at reducing or defining what reason-
able doubt is any further. The court has wisely warned that attempting
to do so tends to cloud rather than clarify the issue. 12 Since there is no
constitutional reason to expressly define such a term, and since Virginia
discourages such attempts at definition, a Sullivan error should not occur
here unless ajudge goes further than is customary. If it becomes an issue,
an objection can, and indeed should, be made to instructions that
resemble the ones given in Cage and Sullivan.
The reasonable doubt issue does suggest another possible issue,
however. Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(C) requires the Common-
wealth to prove the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reason-
able doubt before the jury can impose the death penalty. Without asking
for a definition of reasonable doubt, defense counsel should consider
requesting an instruction to the effect that the Commonwealth must erase
all reasonable doubt about the aggravating factors from the minds of the
jurors before they can impose death, as well as further instructions that
make the jury aware that there is in no instance a duty to sentence to death,
even if aggravating factors are found beyond a reasonable doubt.
13
Summary and analysis by:
Barbra Anna Pohl
Members of the jury, I will now instruct you on the manner
in which you are to consider the evidence that has been
presented in this sentencing proceeding.
Before you may fix the punishment of defendant at death,
you must find, unanimously andbeyond a reasonable doubt, the
existence of the aggravating circumstance(s) about which I
have previously instructed you.
In order to fix the punishment of defendant at life impris-
onment, you are not required to reach a unanimous decision as
to the existence of any particular fact in mitigation. You are not
required to find any fact in mitigation beyond a reasonable
doubt.
I further instruct you that, under our law, you are permitted
to fix the punishment of defendant at life if you find that to be
the appropriate sentence, even if you find unanimously and
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the aggravating
circumstance(s) about which I have previously instructed you.
MUELLER v. VIRGINIA
113 S. Ct. 1880 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Authorities arrested Everett Lee Mueller for the rape and murder of
ten-year old Charity Powers after her body was found in a shallow grave
near his home. The police advised the defendant of his Miranda rights
and he agreed to talk to authorities. At one point during the questioning
Mueller asked the detective, "[D]o you think I need an attorney here?"
The detective shook his head and shrugged. He then said, "[y]ou'rejust
talking to us." Shortly thereafter, Mueller confessed to the rape and
murder.
The defendant moved to suppress the confession, claiming it was
obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona.1 The trial court denied the
1451 U.S. 477,484-85 (1981) (holding that oncedefendant invokes
right to counsel, all police questioning must cease until counsel has been
provided).
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motion. The jury found Mueller guilty of the rape and murder and
sentenced him to death. On review, the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed its holding in Eaton v. Commonwealth2 that a defendant must
make an unambiguous and unequivocal request for an attorney in order
to trigger the Edwards protection.
3
Mueller petitioned to the United States Supreme Court which
denied certiorari. Three justices dissented from the denial of certiorari
and it is their dissent that we review here. It is not a common practice of
the Capital Defense Digest to review dissents from denial of certiorari,
but we believe that this dissent may portend a change in the law on an
issue of importance for Virginia defense attorneys and, for this reason,
wish to bring it to the attention of the bar. Denial of certiorari, of course,
has no significance as precedent.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In Edwards v. Arizona,4 the United States Supreme Court held that
"when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established
by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial
interrogation." 5 In Edwards, the Court reaffirmed an accused's Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation. In Miranda v. Arizona,6 the Court had previously estab-
lished that once a defendant asserted his right to counsel the police were
required to halt the interrogation until the arrival of his attorney. In
Edwards, the police ceased the interrogation upon the defendant's
invocation of his right to counsel, only to resume questioning the next day
outside the presence of the requested attorney. The Supreme Court noted
that this behavior violated the defendant's constitutional right to have
counsel present during interrogation and held that the trial court should
have suppressed the subsequent confession.
In Smith v. Illinois,7 the United States Supreme Court observed that
the states have developed three standards by which to judge an ambigu-
ous request for counsel. 8 Some courts require that all questioning cease.
Some courts set a threshold standard and hold that if defendant does not
prove that he acted with sufficient clarity to satisfy this standard, the
protections in Edwards do not apply. Other courts require police officers
to clarify the defendant's wishes after an equivocal request in order to
determine whether the defendant has invoked his Fifth Amendment
right.9 The dissenters from the denial of certiorari in Mueller construed
the Virginia approach to be a variation on the second (threshold) standard
and lamented the high court's refusal to rule upon the differences: "[Uit
2 240 Va. 236, 397 S.E.2d 385 (1990). See also case summary of
Eaton, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 22 (1990).
3 Id. at 253-54, 397 S.E.2d at 395-96.
4 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
5 Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
6 384 U.S. 436,474 (1966).
7 469 U.S. 91 (1984).
8 Id. at 95-96.
9 Mueller v. Virginia, 113 S. Ct. 1880,1881 (1993) (citing Smith,
469 U.S. at 95-96, & n.3).
10 Mueller, 113 S. Ct. at 1881.
is apparent that a substantial number of criminal defendants who are
identically situated in the eyes of the Constitution have received and will
continue to receive dissimilar treatment because of the different ap-
proaches taken by the lower courts." 10
There is support for the view that the Virginia standard is unconsti-
tutional. In Smith, the United States Supreme Court found that the
defendant's response, "I'd like to do that," to a detective's question about
the defendant's comprehension of the right to have an attorney present
was sufficient to trigger the defendant's Fifth Amendment protections.
1
The Supreme Court then established the framework for the applica-
tion of this rule. First the courts must find that the accused "actually
invoked his right to counsel." 12 If so, then the courts must suppress any
further statements made in response to interrogation unless the defendant
both initiated the ensuing conversation with the authorities and know-
ingly and intelligently waived his right to have an attorney present. In
Smith, the defendant's statement was found to have invoked the right to
an attorney and his later post-request response could not be used to make
his question appear ambiguous.
13
An argument can be made that Mueller's request was clearer than
Smith's. Mueller brought the subject to the detective's attention himself.
Smith merely responded to the detective's statement. Moreover, Mueller's
question suggests his desire to have a lawyer present. The detective's
somewhat deceptive response prevented Mueller from stating that desire
in more forceful terms. Indeed, the detective's response made clear that
he would not honor Mueller's rights on those terms alone. Mueller did
not know that his rights would be honored under any circumstances.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has also opted for an approach
to the Edwards issue that is more favorable to defendants. In Poyner v.
Murray, 14 approving the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit,15 the court
stated that "the court correctly noted that once a suspect makes an
equivocal request for an attorney, all interrogation must cease except that
which is necessary to clarify whether or not the accused wants an
attorney." 16 This standard clearly falls within the third bracket noted in
Smith - a standard much higher than the one employed in Virginia and
a standard that may have made all the difference for defendant Mueller.
The dissent of three Supreme Court justices and the deviation from
the Fourth Circuit standard make the Edwards issue worth recognizing
and probing because the Virginia rule may fall in the future.
17
Summary and analysis by:
Cameron P. Turner
11 Smith, 469 U.S. at 95.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 964 F.2d 1404 (4th Cir. 1992).
15 United States v. Jardina, 747 F.2d 945, 948 (5th Cir. 1984).
16 Poyner, 964 F.2d at 1411 (citing Jardina, 747 F.2d at 948).
17 EDITOR'S NOTE: Indeed, as this issue was going to print, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Davis v. United States
(92-1949), raising the issue of whether clarification by interrogators of
the ambiguous request, "maybe I should talk to a lawyer," is sufficient,
or whether interrogation must cease altogether.
